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NOTES AND COMMENTS
COVENANTS
RUNNING OF A COVENANT TO PAY ASSESSMENTS ON OTHER
LANDS OF THE GRANTOR
The plaintiff's grantor, Michael Maher, conveyed a thirty-foot strip
of land in the rear of his property to the grantor of the defendant.
The consideration recited in the deed was two dollars and a covenant,
"As part of the consideration of this deed, said grantee agrees to protect
and save harmless the grantor from all assessments for the opening of
Storer Avenue . . . as to said grantor's adjoining or abutting property."
The defendant's deed to the land contained the clause, "and being the
same land and subject to the same conditions contained in the deed from
Michael Maher to the Farmers' and Drovers' Stockyards Co." The
street was laid by the city. The defendant refused the demand of the
plaintiff that the assessments be paid. The court ordered the defendant
to pay the city of Cleveland the assessments levied on the plaintiff's land
for the opening of the street. Maher v. Cleve. Union Stockyards Co.,
55 Ohio App. 412, 9 N.E. (2nd) 995 (1937).
The theory upon which the court bases its decision is that the cov-
enant to pay assessments on other lands of the grantor is one running
with the land; that is, the right to take advantage of the covenant will
pass with a conveyance of the covenantee's estate, and the liability for
its performance will pass to a subsequent grantee of the covenantor by a
mere conveyance of the land of the convenantor.
To determine whether a particular covenant runs with the land, it
may be necessary to examine its form and character as well as the inten-
tion of the parties. Spencer's Case, decided in 1583, laid down a rule
as to the form of running covenants which has been referred to by many
courts. According to the rule in Spencer's Case, 5 Coke, 16 A, 77 Eng.
Rep. 72 (583), if the covenant relates to a thing in esse, the word
"assigns" need not be used in order for the covenant to run, but if it
relates to a thing not in being, "assigns" must be named in the instru-
ment of conveyance. Maryland & P. R. Co. v. Silver, I I o Md. 510,
73 Atl. 297 (19o9); Duester v. 1llvin, 74 Ore. 544, 145 Pac. 66o
(1915). This technical rule has been abrogated by many courts. "The
use of the words 'assignees' or 'heirs and assigns' is not necessary or
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essential to create a covenant running with the land, and in determining
whether a covenant will run the material inquiries are whether the parties
intended to impose such burdens on the land and whether it is one that
may be imposed consistently with principle and equity." Johnson v.
American Gas Co., 8 Ohio App. 124 (1917); Masury v. Southworth,
9 Ohio St. 34 (1859); Frederick v. Callahan, 40 Iowa 311 (877);
Eche v. Fetzer, 65 Wis. 55, 26 N.W. 266 (i886).
A covenant will not run with the land unless it "touches and con-
cerns" the lands, its use, occupation, or enjoyment. The covenant must
attach to the land or to some interest therein granted. Whalen v.
Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., io8 Md. I, 69 At. 390 (1908); Mus-
cogee Mfg. Co. v. Eagle & Phenix Mills, 126 Ga. 210, 54 S.E. 1028
(19o6); Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,
i14 Ohio St. 685 (1926); Easter v. Little Miami Ry. Co., 14 Ohio
St. 48 (1862); Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd Ed., sec. 392. "Cove-
nant to run with the land must respect realty demised and have for its
object something annexed to, inherent in, or connected with the land,
and its performance or nonperformance must affect the nature, quality,
value, or mode of enjoyment of the demised premises." Epting v.
Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S.C. 3o8, 181 S.E. 66 (i935).
No specific standard can be set for determining when a covenant
"touches and concerns" or is "inherent in or connected with" the land
conveyed. In general, if a covenant deals with what might be termed
the normal attributes of ownership, it can be said to "touch and con-
cern" that estate; for example, (I) covenants to pay taxes on premises
granted, Post v. Hearney, 2 N. Y. 394, 51 Am. Dec. 303 (1849);
(2) covenants to erect and maintain fences, Hickey v. Lake Shore, etc.,
R. R. Go., 51 Ohio St. 40, 36 N.E. 672 (1894); (3) and clearly
those covenants which affect the actual physical use of the land granted
such as restrictions on the type of structure which may be erected.
Booth v. Knape, 225 N.Y. 390, 122 N.E. 202 (I919).
If the covenant is of such character that it can run with the land,
the intention of the parties is a controlling factor in determining whether
or not it does run in a particular case. Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa
357, 113 N.W. 941 (907); Milliken v. Hunter, So Ind. I49, ioo
N.E. IO41 (1913); Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bosworth, 46 Ohio
St. 81, 18 N.E. 533 (1888). The expressed intention that th6 covenant
is not to run will prevent a covenant which would otherwise do so
from running with the land. Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 App. Div. 412,
45 N.Y. Supp. 32 (1897); Masury v. Southworth, supra. The con-
verse, however, is not true, for the intentions of the parties cannot con-
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vert a personal obligation into a real covenant. Masury v. Southworth,
sutra; Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Hinchman, 2 12 Fed. 813
(x4); Calif. Packing Corp. v. Grove, 51 Cal. App. 203, 196 Pac.
891 (1921). "Intention of original parties to the contract alone cannot
create a covenant running with the land, but the nature of the covenant
and its relation to the estate must in addition be such that the law will
permit the intention to be effectual." Lingle Water Users' Yss'n. v.
Occidental Bldg. & Loan, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931).
If the requirement of "touching and concerning" the estate granted
is to have any meaning, an agreement to pay assessments on other lands
of the grantor cannot be said to "touch and concern" the estate granted.
It in no ordinary way affects the nature, quality, or value of the thing
demised, nor does it affect the mode of enjoying the premises. The
covenant is comparable to a stipulation providing for the means of
paying the purchase price of the land, and the mere fact that the cove-
nant was expressed in the deed as part of the consideration does not
make it run with the land. City of Richmond v. Bennett, 33 Ky. Law
Rep. 279, 109 S.-W. 904 (I9O8); Ft. Smith Gas Co. v. Gean, 55 S.W.
(2nd) 63 (1932); Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., supra.
"So a covenant to pay for the land in a particular way, as by paying off
certain judgments against the grantor . . . is a covenant personal and
not real." Vells v. Benton. Io8 Ind. 595, 8 N.E. 444, rehearing 9
N.E. 6ox (1886).
To further support its conclusion, the Ohio court applies the theory
of assumption of the obligation by the defendant upon its taking the land
"subject to the same conditions contained in the deed from Michael
Maher." In a mortgage situation, in order for the personal obligation
to pay the debt to pass with the land, the transferee must assume the
liability, and the words "taking subject to" the mortgage are insufficient
to render him personally liable, and the mortgagee can look only to the
land which carries with it the debt. Shepherd v. May, 115 U.S. 505,
29 L. Ed. 456 (x885); Tiffany, Real Property (:d ed.) sec. 622.
If the clause "taking subject to" is also inadequate to amount to an
assumption when used in a case involving a personal covenant, the
grantee should not be held liable on the covenant. On the other hand,
if the words are to be given more weight when used under these facts,
since the burden could not attach to the land, then the defendant had by
their use simply contracted to assume the liability and there was no need
for discussing the running of the covenant.
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